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Abstract
In a previous essay we modeled the enforcement of contract, and
through it the provision of money and markets, as a production func-
tion within the society, the scale of which is optimized endogenously by
labor allocation away from primary production of goods. Government
and a central bank provided fiat money and enforced repayment of loans,
giving fiat a predictable value in trade, and also rationalizing the alloca-
tion of labor to government service, in return for a fiat salary. Here, for
comparison, we consider the same trade problem without government or
fiat money, using instead a durable good (gold) as a commodity money
between the time it is produced and the time it is removed by manufac-
ture to yield utilitarian services. We compare the monetary value of the
two money systems themselves, by introducing a natural money-metric
social welfare function. Because labor allocation both to production and
potentially to government of the economy is endogenous, the only con-
straint in the society is its population, so that the natural money-metric
is labor. Money systems, whether fiat or commodity, are valued in units
of the labor that would produce an equivalent utility gain among compet-
itive equilibria, if it were added to the primary production capacity of the
society.
1 Introduction
In a previous essay we formalized one aspect of the observation that the econ-
omy is embedded in the polity and its society. The rules of society such as the
commercial code, contract law, and the bankruptcy law are all necessities that
must be paid for. It costs to create them, but it also costs to enforce them. The
rules of the game for the market economy are not immutable; they are part of
the creation of the rules of the economic game within the political and societal
games. They will be more or less obeyed as a function of many societal, bu-
reaucratic, and political factors. The honesty and efficiency of the bureaucracy,
peer pressure, customs and conventions of society all play a role. The supply
∗We adopt the convention that in joint work the order of appearance of names on the
publication should be selected randomly unless there is a specific stated reason otherwise. We
have acted accordingly.
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and maintenance of the institutional structure that permits the functioning of
the economy is, for the most part, a given to the short-run economic agent. The
economic system is open to its political and societal environment, but their vari-
ables are the parameters for economic activity. The time scales of these systems
are different and generally much longer than those internal to the economy.
In the previous essay, by adding as parameters of the economic system tax-
ation, the salaries of the bureaucracy, the default rules, and the enforcement
technology, we obtain an endogenously determined optimal size for the bureau-
cracy, as a function of their values. In the interplay among the economy, polity,
and society over a longer period, the parameters may be modified. In the highly
simplified model presented here and previously, these longer-term modifications
are ignored. Here the labor costs of producing commodity money as a substitute
for the role of the bureaucracy is examined.
1.1 Previous results and some new questions
In the previous essay a model was constructed with fiat money mediating the
signals of commitment needed by agents to determine the natural scale of gov-
ernment as a support for anonymous markets. No sensitivity analysis was given
of the consequences of our particular choice of money. Although essentially
all modern economies utilize fiat, a reasonable question motivated by histori-
cal succession of moneys is what relation different stages have to each other.
Is gold with a king’s stamp a pure commodity money? Is fiat intrinsically a
debt contract for gold, or is it an instrument within a system defined by quite
independent rules, and do debt contracts merely provide a mechanisms for the
orderly transition from a material substrate. Here we show that the use of
a commodity money is strategically very different from that of a fiat money.
Among other factors, the control options of a government over the economy are
fewer than in a fiat economy.
As observed in our first essay, the strategic market game with fiat introduces
an explicit institutional cost from the creation of government, whose input is
labor and whose output is determined by technologies for enforcing default
penalties on the supervising of central-bank loans and their repayment. Thus
contracts have a specific operational meaning, and the extra-social cost of their
enforcement is institutionally represented. Fiat money emerges as the source of
the basic contracts in a society, without itself being a contract for anything.
In this essay, a second strategic market game is presented. This game omits
the institutional cost of government by using the durable commodity as money,
between the time when it is produced and the time when it is consumed by man-
ufacture to yield utilitarian services. The essential element of pre-commitment
that gives fiat its signaling value has a counterpart for commodity money, which
is the cost of acquiring it and the demand for its utility, which agents know. Ide-
alized commodities, however, do not require separate and costly institutions to
give them this signal, because it is assumed that they possess a consumption or
production worth that can be judged by individuals independently at the point
of trade. In the act of exchange, however, commodities are a physical “store of
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value”, which imprints any discounting of the future on the spot interest rate
for all goods, inducing trade inefficiencies that have labor-equivalent costs.
2 The gold standard for fiat: commodity money
An apparent tendency of societies to progress from commodity moneys toward
pure systems of account has sometimes led to a misapprehension that the mean-
ing of fiat derives solely from its origin as a debt contract for gold or some other
imagined ideal commodity. In this view, fiat that goes “off the gold standard”
is a breach of contract (perhaps motivated by its regulatory role) rather than a
regulatory device within its own rule system, which remains poorly understood.
The process structure of strategic market games shows that understanding fiat
requires modeling the actions of government [1], and the model of the first essay
draws the functions of government from the labor budget of the society. In
emphasizing that fiat makes agents predictable by tying a prior commitment
to a default penalty to their bids at market, it shows how fiat can introduce
the first contracts, without itself being a debt contract. In this essay we con-
sider commodity money as an alternative rule system for making agents’ actions
predictable from their preferences and productive capabilities, and compare its
costs and capabilities as a trust substitute to those of fiat1.
2.1 Origins of salvage value
From the first essay we reproduce the form of intertemporal utility of consump-






























As long as the period discount factor 1/β ≡ 1 + ρDt0, we may consistently
take t0 → 0, or small and finite relative to any other timescales in the problem
such as the utility discount horizon 1/ρD, in which limit the period of trade
does not affect the allocations of consumables. The allocations Aji,tt0 are the
bundles of nondurable goods (j) consumed at the end of each trading period
(t) by agent i, and Ci,t is i’s holding of a depreciating capital stock replaced
1Note, as mentioned in the introduction, that fiat is only a trust substitute from the
point of view of the markets. In more complete treatments of government it merely displaces
trust. The important issue raised in discussions of the gold standard is that displaced trust
is limited by the ability of society to control the government, a potential weakness to which
some commodity monies are less readily subject.
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by the input of gold2, held at the beginning of period t, which yields utilitarian
services through the period. The extensive form of the labor-allocation and
buy/sell trading game are given in the first essay, and in App. C, we list all
notation associated with the model as implemented with commodity money.
Idealized commodity money escapes the Hahn paradox if it produces real
consumption value, as gold does in these models at s > 0. It is free of explicit
institutional costs if it exploits pre-existing biological or social means for judging
its value at the point of trade. A stream-of-service model is a more natural model
for the salvage value of gold than point consumption, and the durability 1−∆t0
that we have assumed for the capital stock can be chosen to continuously vary
the cost of replacement. In any model with discounting, the store of value in
commodity money is only as efficient as the agents’ concern for the future, and
the discount rate is inevitably impressed on the spot rate for trade in all goods.
The extensive form for the game with commodity money defines repeated
periods, each with the same structure as the previous essay, except that there
are no bureaucrats. Gold can now be carried across periods as money, and is
invested in capital stock at the beginning of the period, reducing the amount
available for bidding at the trading posts. As in the fiat model, its service does
not begin to be realized until the next period. The only endogenized division
of labor in the current model is between farmers (producers of nondurable con-
sumables) and prospectors (extractors of gold). Two other differences are also
assumed: As gold can be injected into the market by prospectors as bids for
consumable goods, we omit the additional trading post for gold, which was re-
quired in the fiat model if agents were to have a means of obtaining utilitarian
stocks. We also remove any equivalent to a central bank in the form of a lending
market for gold, as its full definition requires conditions for default and leads
us into hybrid models that re-instate a role for government or an equivalent
enforcement institution.
In addition to carry-forward equations for capital stock Ci,t, we now intro-
duce carry-forward equations for gold3. For a farmer indexed i the initial stock
of money in the period µi,t is the limit for combined investment in capital stock
and bids at trading posts. Revenues from sales are carried forward to the next
period, so that













i,t ≥ 0. σi,t is the rate of conversion of
gold to capital stock, dimensionally comparable to its rate of extraction e0. If i
is a prospector the continuity equation includes the rate of primary production
2We find it less ephemeral to model the industrial services rendered by gold than its
aesthetic services. Such a model naturally also provides an exit pathway for gold, other than
wear, theft, or loss of the money supply itself.
3These formally exist also in the fiat money example, but are not used there in nonco-
operative equilibria, so we omitted them from the strategy space in the first essay to reduce
notation.
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but no longer revenues from trading posts:
















i,t ≥ 0. Farmers acquire gold only
through revenue from sales of consumable goods, and everyone acquires capital
stock only by individual conversion of gold.
Trading posts and period-end allocations of nondurable consumable goods
are the same as in the fiat model, except that gold denominates bids. The per-
period utilities are simpler than those for producers embedded in fiat economies,


































































Steady-state solutions to the trading subgame and the labor allocation to
prospecting are derived in App. A. The same patterns of hoarding occur as with
fiat, with the discount rate ρD replacing ρ, and a simpler population structure.
Whereas a tax rule based on the labor allocation was necessary in the fiat model
to allow labor allocation to be determined endogenously, the reduced complexity
of the labor allocation problem removes the need for any such structure with gold
money. The optimal balance of prospecting to farm production is an elementary
equilibrium of supply and demand, with any under-represented type having
superior bidding position in the markets, and inducing a migration of individuals
to adopt that type.
3 Money-metric values and costs of money sys-
tems
We now show that there is a natural measure of the value of any allocation
of goods, which answers the question “what is the money value of the money
system itself”, either relative to another money system or relative to no-trade
or autarchy. Our construction is similar to one used to assign value to non-CE
allocations from one-period trade with exogenous market structure [2]. It is
based on the observation that any initial endowment, in a society with given
preferences, defines an uncaptured segment of the Pareto set to which an in-
trinsic money-measure can be assigned [3]. Pareto optima, including but not
limited to the CE, distribute among the society the value of capturing the whole
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segment. Other allocations leave sub-segments uncaptured, and their efficiency
relative to the Pareto optima is the ratio in money metric of the segments they
capture to the available gain from Pareto-optimal trade.
The essential feature of the model, exploited quantitatively in App. B, is the
separation of timescales, between long periods over which the money system
is assumed fixed, and short repeated trading periods in which it is used. The
money system specifies a rational trading strategy for repeated use until it can
be changed. Variations in the money system entail variations in repeated trade
outcomes, over which the multi-period utility for individual rounds of trade
induces an effective utility for money systems represented as pre-committed re-
peated strategies. Three basic observations emerge from the analysis of App. B:
First, the CE of the independently chosen intertemporal strategies corre-
spond to the CE of the effective utility for repeated strategies, but the two
utilities are generally not of the same form. In this model at s 6= 0, the utility
for committed strategies is equivalent to a simple Cobb-Douglas form, in which
the exponents on consumables and gold reflect their actual weight in the first-
order conditions. In the intertemporal model, only the combination of utility
variation with the integrated carry-forward equation (Eq. (7) of the first essay)
produces these first-order conditions.
Second, as the identification of Pareto optima is not constrained by process,
the problem is equivalent to a General Equilibrium model in which a single
input (labor) is converted through a set of production functions to diverse util-
itarian goods. Both the single-period and the accumulated (effective) utilities
we have chosen are Gorman aggregatable, so that the Pareto set is an (n − 1)-
dimensional linear space defined by redistributions of a single commodity bundle
among the n agents. The natural numéraire for that bundle is the unique scarce
resource in the society: labor counted as agent-periods4.
Third, the measure of the efficiency of a money system is a ratio of two
endogenously-defined money-metric social welfare functions. It is a sum over
agents i of terms exp [−D (P ‖ Qi)] weighted by the fraction of whole-society
wealth held by i. D (P ‖ Qi) is an information-theoretic pseudodistance called
the Kullback-Leibler divergence [4], defined and derived in this context in App. B.2.
It measures the divergence of i’s distribution of consumptions relative to a
Pareto-optimal distribution (both denominated in labor-metric).
3.1 Results for fiat and commodity moneys
The money value assigned to Pareto optima in this scheme is mr, the number
of agents contributing to a social welfare function at full employment of the pri-
mary production technologies for goods, with optimal distribution. Commodity
money preserves full primary production, and the fraction of total wealth held
by each agent is the fraction of the society’s labor accounted in the agent’s con-
sumed bundle. Because labor-allocation in the strategic market games precedes
4The natural emergence of a labor metric for value, along with the unrealism of such
a metric as a basis for economic theory, is a consequence of our assumption of efficient,
endogenously optimized labor allocation among linear production functions.
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per-period trade, and is based on anticipated per-period utilities, equal utilities
do not in general result in equal weights in labor-metric. This effect is only a
budget redistribution, though, and does not appear in the whole-society effi-
ciency. The latter results only from non-CE allocation of consumption by each
agent, and thus scales as (ρDt0)
2
/m (45).
Fiat money similarly induces non-CE distribution from the taxation and
interest τ + ρt0, and a reduction in efficiency ∼ (τ + ρt0)
2
/m. As τ + ρt0
is comparable to r̄/r, at small bureaucracy this allocation inefficiency is less
important than the lost of a fraction r̄/r of the society from primary production.
The combination τ + ρt0 in the fiat economy is entirely equivalent in its effects
on allocation, to the monetary interest ρDt0 in the gold economy created by
utilitarian discounting.
4 Discussion
4.1 Fiat, gold and credit
In our previous essay we considered an economy with both fiat money and
credit. The government was required expicitly to enforce debt contracts, and
implicitly to help provide the basis for the acceptance of its fiat. In this essay
we have concentrated on an economy with gold as money. In order to separate
out difficulties we omitted the credit market. Although government will still
nevertheless be needed for many other purposes, including the enforcement of
the commercial code and accounting standards there no longer a need for a bu-
reaucracy to produce and police the money supply or to enforce loan contracts.
Thus, in comparison to the economy with fiat and credit, a bureaucry is not
needed. At the expense of somewhat more calculation we could have included a
credit market for individuals to be able to borrow gold. This would have created
a need for the enforcing bureaucracy as it did in the instance of an economy
with fiat and a credit market. However, as we have already illustrated these
conditions for the endogenous bureaucracy, here we limit our concern to illus-
trating the costs of private production of a commodity money. The bureaucrats
with a cheaply produced fiat with strategic control over the money supply are
replaced by a competitive manufacturing industry with associated costs.
4.2 Governments and markets within open systems
A critical observation is that one function provided by government is to output
a self-referential definition of its own structure and strategy set. Another is
the publication of interfaces to the decentralized labor pool (as well as other
markets), and with it the distribution of benefits to the members who make up
the coalitions.
We have argued descriptively that the theory of decentralized coordination
cannot be sensibly defined within a closed system, and that it operates within
the structure of rules output by institutions. These in turn act within the social
7
norms of society, so in fact each sector is an open system coupled to a larger
source of institutional supports.
A glance at economic history shows that the economic structures of soci-
ety shape the trust habits of their members in ways that affect their play of
games isolated from any of those economies [5]. Thus rule systems over time
alter the habit structures of people, in ways that the rules can be designed to
exploit5. An important dynamical question is whether any self-referential cas-
cade of government and markets can function without depending for most of its
inputs on social norms that it does not in fact create. It is known that within
biology many coordination devices would be ruled out as perpetuum mobili in
closed systems, which function robustly as catalysts for substrate-level driven
processes. It would be interesting to formalize the question whether the stabil-
ity of government and market systems is possible only when they are catalysts
of large-scale coordination activities driven mostly by social norms and habits.
In the narrow sense that governments must more than pay for the cost of their
maintenance to be created in these games, we have asserted a very weak version
of that result.
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A Interior solutions to specialization and trade
with commodity money
This appendix solves the trading subgame and identifies the interior solution
for labor allocation in the commodity-money markets of Sec. 2.1.
A.1 Intertemporal variations with carry-over
The variation of a farmer’s intertemporal utility (5) with commodity money,
(neglecting impacts by passing to infinite r, and using the conservation rela-
tions (Eq. (7) of the first essay) and (3) to accumulate the consequences of





































































5In a society with habits of rule-following, a far smaller force can be allocated to sustain a
rule than would be necessary in cases of mass defection
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where now j ∈ 1, . . . ,m because there is no trading post for gold, and σi,tt0
competes with bids rather than being drawn from purchases. Rearranging the
sums over t and t′ in Eq. (7) applies the “shadow of the future” to all present





















































































The sums of discounted λi,t′ for q and b variations are equivalent to the combi-
nations of λ and η constraints in the fiat model: they impose a condition of no
wash selling at any β < 1. The shadow of the future looms one period larger on
bids than offers, so the hoarding depends on ∆t0 as well as β. The prospector







































































A.2 Stationary, type-symmetric trade solutions
A subset of the reduced notation for type-symmetric solutions of the trading
subgame with fiat describes allocations with commodity money. To the terms
defined we must add µ0 for the stationary carry-over money supply of prospec-
tors, and µ for farmers. Summing the geometric series of discount factors and
solving for the K-T multipliers λ, the discounted value of future service from
capital stock replaces the penalty constraint as the limit on spot consumption.
Only nondurable goods are priced, and their prices are all equal, so the marginal

































on other’s consumable goods, where
α0 =
sβ∆t0





replaces s as the scale for marginal utilities in the presence of intertemporal dis-
counting. Comparison against the fiat first-order conditions (Equations (38-44)
of the first essay) shows that the effective per-period interest from discounting,
ρDt0 = 1/β − 1, now appears also as the spot rate replacing τ + ρt0. All K-T
multipliers are nonzero, so farmers either bid or convert all their gold every pe-
riod, µ = σt0 + (m − 1) b, and prospectors carry nothing forward µ0 = 0. Their
extraction endowment covers bids and use in capital stock e0t0 = σ0t0 + mb0.
Unlike the fiat case, with commodity money the bids like the offers scale as t0
rather than with a fixed money supply, so that the velocity of circulation goes
to a constant as t0 → 0.
With commodities as with fiat there is hoarding of endowed goods A‖/A⊥ =
1+ρDt0. Capital stocks σ0/σ = b0/b replace the K-T multipliers of the penalty
constraint, and the condition of equal utility between prospectors and farmers
becomes
(m + s) log
b0
b
= log (1 + ρDt0) , (14)
The absence of a gold market keeps prospectors from hoarding, so that their
overall level of consumption is reduced to a utility equivalent to the suboptimal
utility of hoarding farmers. All money is used each period, and returned to













The bidding strength of prospectors versus farmers is inverse, through Eq. (15),
to their numbers in the population, so the neutrality condition (14) defines a
stable equilibrium the livelihood distribution. Combining solutions of Eq. (11)
for q with Eq. (12) to remove the 1/β, and making use of Eq. (15), consumptions


















, (1 + ρDt0) , 1
)
, (16)























B Money-metric utilities for committed decisions
The adoption of a money system commits a society to a specific rational labor
allocation and trade strategies for as long as they use it, both of which are in gen-
eral different from those of a CE. It is thus sensible to associate variations in the
money system with the joint variations in all one-period strategies, correspond-
ing to stationary solutions of the varying system. The per-period preferences
then induce preferences for these joint variations, which are not generally of the
same form. The CE of the intertemporal utility is also the CE of the corre-
sponding joint-variation problem, but that latter generally has a larger Pareto
set, corresponding to repeated non-CE trade strategies, that are not required
by the money system alone. We consider these because they restrict the full
set of Pareto-optimal trade strategies (most of which are nonstationary) to a
stationary one-period equivalent set that contains the non-optimal strategies as-
sociated with stationary NE of general money systems. This restricted Pareto
set is characterized by a constant money-metric social welfare function, and
the effective preferences then define efficiency measures relative to it for general
stationary allocations.
B.1 Effective preferences for repeated decisions




























in which the capital stock decays by a fraction ∆t0 per period, so that









In this appendix only, because the goal is to identify the structure of Pareto
optima, i is an index representing all agents, whose types need not be distin-
guished in the notation. However, we continue to denote by rj the number of
agents producing nondurable good j in steady state, and by mr0 the number



























Expanding around any stationary solution Aji,t ≡ A
j
i , σi,t = σi, in which Ci,t =
























where α0 is as in Eq. (13).
Commitment to a repeated strategy sets δAji,t ≡ δA
j
i , δσi,t ≡ δσi,∀t. The












































where we use ρDt0/ (1 − β) = 1/β.
Eq. (23) is equivalent, under monotone transformation, to the Cobb-Douglas
























































 t0 = ϕit0. (28)


























Even at fixed budget, agents can individually alter the labor allocation, each








Enforcing this constraint on Eq. (22) (the Lagrangian multiplier is suppressed
from the notation here to simplify the presentation), and using Eq. (30) to relate
variations in Aji and σi to r
j and mr0, gives the property of prices and labor
allocations at any Pareto optimum of these preferences subject to a fixed labor
force and production technology:
p0e0 = pja ⇒ mr0 = α0rj , j ∈ 1, . . . ,m. (31)
If we normalize prices by the condition p0e0 = 1,6 the society wealth (29) on
the Pareto set becomes
∑
i′
ϕi′ = mr. (32)
B.2 Direct money-metric utility for repeated strategies
Cobb-Douglas utilities are Gorman aggregatable [6], implying Pareto optima
defined by a single price system, dependent only on the whole-society endow-
ments. The only constraint in the committed-choice problem is whole-society
labor, which both accounts for the single price system (31), and implies that
money-metric at equilibrium prices is ultimately labor-metric.
The direct money-metric utility [6] for any agent i at equilibrium prices is







. With the labor-normalization for prices (32), the





















is the Kullback-Leibler divergence [4] of the actual distribution of labor cost



















6The straightforward normalization ρDt0/ (1 − β) = 1/β, corresponding to the infinite
sum of discounted values of one producer’s gold in each period of the game, differs from unity
only because we have scaled utilities with ρDt0 rather than 1 − β, using Euler’s formula to
normalize the utility weights to one at t0 → 0.
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α0, 1, . . . , 1
)
. (36)
D (P ‖ Qi) is positive semidefinite and Hausdorf, vanishing only for Qi = P.
The direct money-metric utility at equilibrium prices coincides for Gorman
economies with the dual contour money-metric utility [3], an intrinsic measure of







. The contour money-metric utility has the property that
its sum over agents in the economy is an invariant of all Pareto optima in the
contour, which for Gorman economies extends to the entire Pareto set. The sum
of utilities (33) is thus an intrinsic money measure (here, a labor measure) of the
part of the Pareto-set contour inside the initial indifference surfaces captured
by the agents. Its maximum mr, attained everywhere in the Pareto set, defines










is an intrinsic measure of the efficiency of any allocation produced by a station-
















measuring the fraction of labor cost represented by i’s consumption bundle, and
satisfying
∑
i Wi = 1 for all outcomes in which every agent adopts one of the
primary production technologies. Note that Eq. (37) is a function entirely of
rates of consumption relative to rates of production, but that Eq. (38) converts
these ratios into the fractions of a stock variable (population) provisioning any
individual i.
B.3 Solutions for ideal commodity money
Returning to the allocations for pure commodity money from App. A it is
straightforward to compute the weight functions and labor distributions for










Solving progressively from Eq. (16), the ratio of distributions of wealth that





m + ρDt0 + α0ξ
(ξ, 1, . . . , 1, (1 + ρDt0) , 1, . . . , 1) , (40)
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where (1 + ρDt0) appears in the jth entry corresponding to the good produced.






















(ξ, 1, . . . , 1) , (42)



















W + mr0W0 = 1, and Q and Q0 differ from P by terms
∼ ρDt0, (ξ − 1).
To illustrate while maintaining tolerable algebra, we suppose α0/m ¿ 1,
which can be achieved at large m, small salvage value s, or durable capital






















































at large m+α0. Translating the efficiency measure (44) into actual cost in terms
















In other words, the utilitarian cost to each set of agents sufficient to make
up a full suite of specialist production, from the imprinting of the discount
horizon onto a monetary interest rate, is equivalent to having lost the output
of ∼ (ρDt0)
2
/2 agents’-worth of labor deployed with the same durable capital
stock but without interest.
B.4 Solutions for fiat and markets in all goods
The distributions resulting from ideal fiat money (Eq. (58,59) in App. A of the






which may be compared with Eq. (39) for ideal commodity money. The ratio





m + α0 (1 + τ + ρt0) x
(
(1 + τ + ρt0) x, 1, . . . , 1
)
. (47)





m + τ + ρt0 + α0x
(
x, 1, . . . , 1, (1 + τ + ρt0) , 1, . . . , 1
)
, (48)
where (1 + τ + ρt0) appears in the jth entry corresponding to the good pro-







x, 1, . . . , 1,
)
. (49)








1 + τ + ρt0
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1 + τ + ρt0
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It follows from the no-default conditions (Eq, (51,53) in the first essay) that
mr0W0 + mr̂W + mr̄W̄ = (1 − r̄/r), the fraction of society producing con-
sumer goods. The distributions (48,49) correspond to those in the gold econ-
omy (40,42), under ξ → x and ρDt0 → τ + ρt0. The reason the bureaucrat in
the fiat model allocates goods as the prospector does in the gold economy is
that neither has a money-market trading post, and both serve as the primary
injectors of money into their respective economies. In the fiat model, Eq. (47)
for prospectors is a new form because they have the only non-permutation-
symmetric good.
It follows that at small τ + ρt0, the K-L divergence-corrections from mis-




, (x − 1)
2
)
. Meanwhile, from Eq. (64,67)
of the first essay, we may extract the leading source of lost efficiency, from the




m + α0 − 1
m + α0
(τ + ρt0) . (53)
The average money-metric welfare lost per replica is simply the lost labor from
primary production diverted to the bureaucracy. Fiat is a more valuable tech-
nology than gold money only if r̄/r ≈ (τ + ρt0) < (ρDt0)
2
/2. Since the sales tax
fraction τ is fixed at t0 → 0, fiat is only preferred if gold introduces a sufficiently
large necessary trading period t0 relative to the discount horizon 1/ρD.
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C Definition and condensed notation for vari-
ables and parameters
Notation used in modeling of the gold economy.
Parameters
m Number of types of consumption goods
n ≡ mr Number of agents in the society
t0 Time interval for a cycle of production, trade, and consumption
a Allocation rate of consumption goods to farmers
e0 Allocation rate of gold to prospectors
∆ Rate of decay of capital stock
Υ Scale factor for utilities
ρD Temporal utility discount rate
β Per-period discount fraction
Labor, price, and allocation variables (period notation → stationary notation)
ν0t → mr
0 Number of prospectors at any time t
νjt → r̂ Number of farmers of any consumption good at any time t
Qjt → Q Total quantity offered of a single consumption good
Bjt → B Total gold bid on a single consumption good
pjt → p Price of any consumption good in period t
λi,t → λ Kuhn-Tucker multipliers
Aji,t → A0 Prospector’s final allocation rate of any consumption good
Aji,t → A‖ Farmer’s final allocation rate of self-produced consumption good
Aji,t → A⊥ Farmer’s final allocation rate of other-produced consumption good
σi,t → σ0 Prospector’s conversion rate of gold to capital stock in a period
σi,t → σ Farmer’s conversion rate of gold to capital stock in a period
µi,t → µ0 Prospector’s initial gold carried into period
µi,t → µ Farmer’s initial gold carried into period
Ci,t → σ0/∆ Capital stock of prospectors
Ci,t → σ/∆ Capital stock of farmers
Individual decision variables(period notation → stationary notation)
qji,t → q Self-produced consumption good offered by any farmer per period
bji,t → b0 Bid by prospector on any consumption good
bji,t → b Bid by any farmer on any other-produced consumption good
Table 1: Reduced notation for the decision, price, and allocation variables of
the gold economy in case of stationary solutions.
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